Rapidly expanding mining sector
After a dynamic year in 2025, growth is expected to continue accelerating in 2026. The mining sector will be an even bigger growth engine than in 2025. It is mainly supported by bauxite production, for which Guinea is the world’s leading producer. Production increased by 25% in 2025 (182 Mt) and this momentum is expected to continue in 2026 as global demand for aluminium remains favourable. In addition, the Simandou iron ore mine began exporting ore in October 2025 and its output is expected to increase gradually to 120 Mt per year. It is operated by two consortiums: Winning Consortium Simandou (WCS, SinoSingaporean) and Simfer (Rio Tinto and Chinalco). The 650km Transguinean railway, which carries the ore to the port of Morébaya and is fully financed by the operators, has begun operating and will ramp up capacity in 2026. In addition, the US company Ivanhoe Atlantic has obtained access to the Liberian railway corridor leading to the port of Buchanan for its Kon Kweni iron mine, which is expected to begin operating in 2027. This rail corridor is already used by ArcelorMittal. Despite sluggish iron prices, the sector will continue to support growth and diversify dependence on commodity prices. Last, after a drop in output caused by heavy rainfall in the third quarter of 2025, the gold sector is expected to rebound amid record prices, driven by the Siguiri mine (operated by the South African company AngloGold Ashanti, which produces 47% of the country’s industrial gold). Nevertheless, the excellent mining momentum will continue amid a politically contentious environment. In May 2025, the authorities revoked 86 mining permits to tighten production control and increase associated revenues. Most of the affected mines were underexploited or had licences that were close to expiring. However, the Emirati company Axis, the country’s secondlargest bauxite producer, whose permit was revoked, brought a case against Guinea before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in December 2025 and is seeking USD 30 billion in damages. The issue of locally processing bauxite into aluminium is a recurring point of conflict between the government and operators. On that score, the Emirati stateowned group EGA (through its local subsidiary GAC) also had its Boké operating licence revoked in August 2025 on the grounds that the refinery planned in the original 2004 agreement had never been built. Its activities were nationalised and transferred to a new stateowned company, Nimba Mining Company (NMC). In this context, Chinese groups SPIC and WCS yielded to the government’s demands and launched the construction of two bauxite refineries in March and December 2025. However, the state of energy infrastructure and the lack of skilled labour will complicate local processing.
The agricultural sector will continue its expansion, while the decline in fishing activity will persist. Services will maintain their stable and sustained growth. Nonextractive growth is expected to reach 5.8% (compared with 5.6% in 2025). Despite improvement in 2025, fuel supply will continue to be unstable. The new fuel depots under construction (in Kodiaran and Morébaya), intended to replace the Kaloum depot destroyed in an explosion in December 2024, will not be completed in 2026. The electricity situation in Upper Guinea, marked by frequent outages, is expected to stabilise with the planned connection of Kankan (the country’s secondlargest city) to the Ivorian grid in June 2026 and the improvement of regional interconnections. Nevertheless, the instability of the energy supply will continue to weigh on national activity. A significant improvement will only occur once the liquefied natural gas import terminal—designed to supply several power plants—is completed, and once the 300MW Amaria hydroelectric dam, built by the Chinese group TBEA and scheduled to enter service in 2027, comes online.
Inflation is expected to remain moderate in 2026, thanks to the restoration of fuel supply and a prudent monetary policy, but it could be undermined by a lasting increase in oil prices, which account for 25% of imports. The Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea (BCRG) lowered its key interest rates three times in 2025. The rate fell from 11.5% and stood at 9.75% in March 2026. The continuation of monetary policy easing will be closely correlated with movements in energy prices. Furthermore, the Guinean franc slowly depreciated against the US dollar in early 2026 but remains overvalued, while foreign exchange reserves are very limited (the equivalent of 1.7 months of imports in March 2026) due to BCRG’s intervention in the markets. Last, low banking penetration, tight controls on withdrawals, and the significant hoarding of cash are putting increasing pressure on the volume of banknotes in circulation, which weighs on economic activity.
Clear improvement in the external balance
The 2026 Budget had not yet come into force at the beginning of March 2026, with the State operating under provisional twelfths. However, the public deficit is expected to narrow slightly and be close to the target of 3% of GDP. It will benefit from the expansion of mining revenues (20% of public revenues) thanks to the opening of Simandou, as well as from some rationalisation of tax collection in the mining sector. At the same time, a significant increase in investment spending has been announced (28%), particularly in infrastructure, social protection and poverty reduction. Although Guinea has long favoured strict fiscal discipline, budget management has historically been hit and miss, so significant slippages are possible. Subsidies to power operator Électricité de Guinée will continue to weigh heavily on public finances (around 1% of GDP and 8% of revenues). The public deficit will be financed mainly through multilateral loans, as access to domestic credit is limited by the narrowness of the banking system, which is already highly exposed to sovereign debt. The public debt ratio, which is moderate and half external, is expected to fall thanks to robust growth. Discussions with the IMF, which were launched in mid2024 for a programme accompanied by an Extended Credit Facility, were still ongoing in March 2026 and were hampered by delays in the return to constitutional order.
The current account deficit, which had previously risen extensively owing to imports associated with mining development, will improve significantly in 2026 thanks to the completion of certain facilities and the rapid increase in mineral exports. These exports had already risen sharply in 2025 (+43% yearonyear), driven by bauxite and iron ore. Gold exports (30% of total exports) increased by 43.4%, with the rise in prices outweighing the decline in volumes. This increase is expected to continue in 2026. The development of refining capacity (gold, bauxite) should raise the value of exports and partially offset imports connected with foreign mining projects. Also in 2025, amid cash shortages, the importation of banknotes from the United Arab Emirates weighed heavily on the trade balance (the secondlargest import item, accounting for 6% of total import value). The services balance, as well as the primary income balance, will remain heavily in deficit, burdened by FDI and by the repatriation of profits from the extractive sector. The importance of the Chinese market for Guinean bauxite has increased (98% of exports in December 2025, compared with 70% at end2024), at the same time as bauxite shipments to the United Arab Emirates have fallen sharply.
Return to constitutional order, but a largely unchanged political leadership
General Mamady Doumbouya, who came to power in September 2021 by overthrowing President Alpha Condé in a coup d’état, comfortably won the presidential election in November 2025. He secured 86.72% of the vote after sidelining any serious opposition threat. The election followed the constitutional reform passed in September 2025 which extended the presidential term from five to seven years, authorised military personnel to run for office and created a Senate in which onethird of the members are appointed by the President. Boycotted by the opposition, the constitutional referendum saw an overwhelming victory for the “yes” vote (89%). The Prime Minister of the transitional government, Amadou Oury Bah, was reappointed. The legislative elections scheduled for 24 May 2026 will mark the end of the transition period, although the political class is generally expected to retain its grip on key positions. The ruling party, the Generation for Modernity and Development (GMD), is the clear favourite. The dissolution of the main opposition parties, including the Rally of the People of Guinea (RPG) led by former president Alpha Condé and the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) of Cellou Dalein Diallo, was declared on 9 March 2026. The government has accused these parties, some of which had already been suspended since August 2025, of failing to comply with the new legislative provisions. Social and political tensions are likely to persist, fueled by political repression and conflicts between herders and farmers. The main threat to those in power comes from the military. The concentration of authority in presidential hands and the preferential treatment granted to certain units are causing internal dissent.
In 2025, Guinea sought to ease tensions with its regional neighbours. In January 2026, ECOWAS lifted its remaining sanctions (already eased in February 2024). At the same time, relations with Mali also improved and the two countries signed an agreement to develop a commercial transport corridor between Conakry and Bamako. However, relations with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) will remain at arm’s length. By contrast, ties with Sierra Leone deteriorated in April–May 2025 after a border dispute around the mining village of Yenga erupted again, leading to clashes and the capture of Sierra Leonean soldiers in February 2026. That said, tensions may ease. On the global stage, Guinea maintains excellent relations with China, whose mining interests are vast, especially in Simandou. Stronger expressions of interest towards the US will continue following the signing of a bilateral critical minerals protocol in February 2026 without immediate financial commitments. In March, Conakry also entered a health cooperation agreement with the US that will provide USD 91 million in aid over five years. In terms of security, the country also maintains close ties with France. Relations with the United Arab Emirates have suffered as a result of the expulsion of Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA), but the UAE will continue to remain the main buyer of Guinean gold.

Китай
Гана
Индия
Европа
Малайзия
Великобритания
Обединени арабски емирства